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I. INTRODUCTION
1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of the statement by the President
of the Security Council dated 30 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/75), in which
the Security Council stressed that a determined effort must be made by the
international community to promote the repatriation of the Rwandese refugees,
to reduce intimidation of prospective returnées and to improve security in the
Rwandese refugee camps, especially those in Zaire. To that end, the Security
Council requested me, inter alia, to continue to explore, as appropriate, all
possible means of addressing the problems of security in the Rwandese
refugee camps.
2. While there have been some positive developments since my report of 18
November 1994 (8/1994/1308) in respect of the creation of conditions
conducive to repatriation, the continuing presence of nearly 2 million
Rwandese refugees in Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire is a
matter of serious concern. The general security situation in the camps remains
dangerous tar both refugees and relief workers. The situation is also
potentially destabilizing for the host countries and for the subregion as a
whole. The only effective solution to this problem remains the safe and
voluntary repatriation of the refugees. Accordingly: and taking into account the
improving situation within Rwanda, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) relterated, in December 1994, that it
would assist, wherever possible, the voluntary return of those refugees who
wished to go back to Rwanda.
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3. The Government of Rwanda has signed tripartite agreements with UNHCR
and the Governments of Burundi and Zaire respectively on the voluntary
repatriation of refugees. These agreements define the conditions for
repatriation, including returnee protection and land tenure. The Governments
of Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania are also involved in an
ongoing dialogue on issues affecting the refugees in the latter country and
their repatriation to Rwanda.
4. So far, only 200,000 refugees out of those who left the country after 6 April
1994 have returned to Rwanda. As indicated in my report of 18 November, the
combined factors of intimidation by the former government leaders, military
and militia of refugees who wish to return to Rwanda and the concern on the
part of the refugees that they may face reprisals and/or may not be able to
regain their property once they do return to the country continue to be the main
factors impeding repatriation.
5. In pursuance of the Security Council's presidential statement of 30 November,
I dispatched a joint technical team from the Department of Peace-keeping
Operations and UNECR, to Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania and
Zaire from 11 to 19 December to review the situation prevailing in the refugee
camps. The team's findings are summarized below. 
II. PRESENT SITUATION
A. Refugees in Burundi
6. There are approximately 200,000 refugees, mostly from southern Rwanda, in
Burundi., primarily in the northern region of the country. There is constant
movement of refugees in this area, as Rwandese continue to seek security in
Burundi and both Rwandese and Burundi nationals continue to move to the
United Republic of Tanzania in search of more secure conditions.
7. Considering the very sensitive nature of the security problems in Burundi,
UNHCR's efforts to address security in the refugee camps essentially have
centred around improved monitoring of the prevailing conditions, through an
effective field presence and vigorous démarches with the civilian and military
authorities. UNHCR plans to continue to pursue this course of action, and is
assigning an increased number of experienced officers not only to the regions
of Burundi hosting refugees but also to the capital.
B. Refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania
8. There are approximately 600,000 Rwandese refugees living in eight camps in
the United Republic of Tanzania. While the population of these camps
continues to increase, this influx, as noted above, consists mostly of
Rwandese refugees from Burundi and Burundi nationals seeking more secure
conditions.
3
9. The camps in the United Republic of Tanzania are relatively more secure and
better organized than those in Zaire, mostly because fewer refugees fled to
this area and the relief community was already established in the area before
the influx took place. An in Zaire, the refugees have created governing
structures similar co those that existed in Rwanda, beginning at the prefecture
level and extending down to the commune level. They have choser leaders
who exercise authority at all levels of this hierarchy. Some of these leaders
held the same Positions before the war.) As in refugee camps elsewhere, the
local governing structure in the Rwandese camps in Zaire and the United
Republic of Tanzania provides a sense of organization in the camps, as well
as a security mechanism, and facilitates the delivery of relief assistance.
10. The refugees in the Tanzanian camps have been registered, and assistance is
therefore delivered directly to them. Hence, there is no scope for the misuse of
assistance by refugee leaders, as has beer. the case in Zaire. However,
extremist elements in the camps in the United Republic of Tanzania are
reported to have considerable influence over the refugee population, though to
&'lesser extent than in Zaire.
11. The Tanzanian Government and UNHCR have determined that security in
the camps can be enhanced through the deployment of Tanzanian police
personnel. These personnel not only must be sufficient in number but must
also be adequately equipped to maintain law and order. So far, 310 Tanzanian
police, both general duty and special forces, have been assigned to the
refugee camps. They are currently receiving assistance from UNHCR,
covering such items as tents and food rations, as well as incentive allowances.
UNHCR has also made vehicles and communications equipment available to
the Tanzanian police force.
12. The refugee population has also created its own security force, the "refugee
guardians", which cooperates with the Tanzanian police force. While
conditions are currently stable in the camps, it is nevertheless felt that, given
the degree of control the leaders have over the camp population, they could
easily allow the security situation to deteriorate, should it be in their interest to
do so.
C. Refugees in Zaire
13. There are approximately 1.4 million Rwandese refugees living in the camps in
Zaire. These camps continue to be the most potentially explosive, with the
most acute security situation in the camps north of Lake Kivu, in the Goma
region, where approximately 850,000 refugees are located. It is therefore
considered that, while further steps need to be taken to increase security in the
camps in the United Republic of Tanzania and Burundi, priority should be
accorded to increasing security in the camps in Zaire, especially in the Goma
region.
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14. For the most part, the refugees in the Goma area of Zaire fled Rwanda in mid-
1994. The political leaders of the former Government, as well as their armed
forces and the militia, fled to this area together with countless civilians as the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) gained control over the western part of
Rwanda in the last days of the war. As a result, the refugee population in Zaire
tends to include more political, military and militia elements of the former
Government than the camps in the United Republic of Tanzania or Burundi
and their hostility towards the Government in Kigali is reflected in actions that
have led to insecure conditions in the camps.
15. More specifically, the refugees are intimidated from publicly expressing their
desire to return to Rwanda. The lives of such people, as well as the lives of
politically moderate refugees or those who may have intermarried or are
suspected of being infiltrators are seriously threatened and some of them are
known to have been killed. There is also a significant threat of civil
disturbances in the camps. This threat is especially acute when refugees
congregate together, for example, when relief supplies are distributed. In
addition as in any area containing a large number of people living in highly
dense and impoverished conditions, common crime is prevalent in the camps.
16. The threat to the safety of international relief workers is also significant. There
are now 45 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and about 1,600
international relief workers in the Goma area alone. A large number of local
Zairian and Rwandese relief personnel also work in the camps. The security
threat to these relief workers includes harassment, especially on their way to
and from the camps when they are frequently stopped, in some cases at
gunpoint, and asked to pay tolls or are threatened for other reasons. There is
also a significant risk that relief workers can be caught up in civil disturbances
or incidents between refugees themselves. Some relief workers have been
threatened by refugees who for some reason wrongly perceive them to be
opposed to their interests.
17. Initially, the leaders in the camps were called upon to facilitate the delivery of
relief assistance. Unfortunately, they misused this responsibility by using the
delivery of assistance to persuade refugees to behave according to their
interests and by hoarding and/or selling such assistance rather than
distributing-it. As a result, the incidence of malnutrition, especially in the most
vulnerable groups, including women, children and the elderly, was initially
much higher than it should have been given the level of assistance provided.
Recently, it has however been possible to provide assistance more directly to
the beneficiaries and., as a result, both the negative influence of the camp
leaders and levels of malnutrition have been reduced. In addition, UNHCR is
about to proceed with the registration of refugees in the camps, which will also
help to ensure more effective delivery of relief assistance.
18. The Government of Zaire has taken steps in recent months to enhance the
security situation in the camps. As a result, the security situation has improved
somewhat since my last report. However, it is assessed that the potential for
serious disturbances remains extremely high.
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19. Recently, Japanese and United States seismologists have detected new signs
of a possible volcanic eruption in the seismically active area of Goma. A
UNHCR task force is preparing contingency plans for evacuation from camps
that might be affected, including the identification of temporary sites for the
relocation of the refugee population concerned in the meantime, seismic
activity is being monitored on a regular basis.
20. The majority of refugees are aware that their long-term interests will be served
only by returning to Rwanda and that assistance cannot be provided to them
indefinitely in the camps. It is assumed that at least 25 per cent of the refugees
would not face land tenure problems upon their return to Rwanda and that,
under present conditions, 25 to 50 per cent of the refugees could return in the
next 6 to 12 months. UNHCR also considers that, it security is provided for
repatriation, the rate of voluntary return to Rwanda would increase.
III. MEASURES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURE CONDITIONS IN
THE CAMPS
A. Peace-keeping operation
21. In its presidential statement of 30 November, the Security Council requested
me to consult with potential trcop-contributing countries to assess their
willingness to participate in a possible peace-keeping operation to enhance
security in the camps modelled along the lines described in paragraphs 18 to
2S of my report of IS November. The Council also requested me to provide a
detailed description of the objectives, rules of engagement and costs of such
an operation. Accordingly, the joint Department of Peace-Keeping Operations /
UNRCR technical team was asked to collect pertinent information for use in
the formulation of recommendations along the lines requested by the security
Council.
22. It will be recalled that the objective of the peace-keeping operation outlined in
paragraphs 18 to 25 of my 18 November report was to provide security for
international relief workers, protection for the storage and delivery of
humanitarian assistance and safe passage to. the Rwandese border for those
refugees who wish to return to Rwanda. It as estimated that a force size of
approximately 3,000 all ranks would be required to carry out these tasks in the
camps north of Lake Kivu. A parallel operation, launched simultaneously in the
area south of Lake Kivu, where conditions are marginally more secure, would
require an additional 2,000 troops.
23. The proposed peace-keeping operation was to be conducted in two phases.
During the first phase, two mechanized battalions would cordon off and
establish secure areas in the camps, within which local security units would be
formed and trained by international security experts. During the second phase
of the operation, once reasonably secure conditions were deemed to have
been created, the local forces would take over the security functions being
performed by the peace-keeping troops, with back-up support provided by a
smaller group of United Nations military personnel. The mechanized battalions
would then move forward to create similar secure areas in other locations.
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24. The joint technical mission confirmed the feasibility of such an approach, but
considered that the operation would require more than the originally estimated
3,000 to 5,000 troops. It estimated that the tasks in the north Kivu region alone
would require a force of 4,100, including military logistic support units, instead
of 3,000 as indicated in my report of 18 November. The mission further
concluded that a similar operation in the south Kivu region also would require
a substantially stronger force than originally anticipated. The rules of
engagement for such an operation would, in accordance with normal practice,
authorize the use of force in self-defence, including against forcible attempts .
to impede the discharge of the operation's mandate. In addition, as foreseen
for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) under
resolution 918 (1994), the force would be authorized to take action against
persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United
Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and
distribution of humanitarian relief.
25. Since the adoption of the presidential statement of 30 November, I have
consulted with about 60 potential troop-contributing countries to ascertain their
readiness to make available the troops necessary to undertake such an
operation. As of 23 January, only one country had formally offered a unit.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the option of deploying a peace-
keeping force to address the security issues in the refugee camps in Zaire is
not feasible. Accordingly, it has not been considered necessary to prepare
cost estimates for this option.
B. Alternative measures
1. An international police/military observer croup
26. In its presidential, statement of 30 November, the Security Council also
requested rte to assess the possibility of interim measures aimed at providing
immediate assistance to the Zairian security forces in protecting humanitarian
operations in the camps, including the possibility of deploying security experts,
from member Governments or through contractual arrangements, to train and
monitor the local security forces. Towards this end, the joint Department of.
peace-Keeping Operations / UNHCR technical mission explored the possibility
of an approach based on the deployment of Zairian security forces, which
would assume responsibility for improving security in the camps, with the
support of a group of United Nations civilian police and military observers.
27. In order to enhance security in the camps, it was considered that the local
security forces should perform the following tasks:
(a) Patrolling. As noted above, refugees suffer from the high incidence
of common crime, in addition to intimidation. Relief workers can also be
easily caught up in civil disturbances. A 24-hour patrolling presence of
security personnel could help to maintain law and order, thus alleviating
such threats. These personnel would gradually develop relations with
the refugees and their governing structures and would work with them
in controlling and abating the incidence of common crime;
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(b) Escort and guarding of static points. Given the risks present in
travelling to and from Goma, an escort capacity should be created to
accompany relief workers when travelling at night and in the early
morning. A security presence would also be of benefit at static positions
in the camps, including, for example. at aid-distribution points, UNHCR
and NGO focal sites, hospitals, feeding centres and dispensaries. A
security presence would also be required to keep a sense of order and
calm during the census and registration of the refugees, which UNHCR
is planning to conduct in the camps in the near future;
(c) Storage and transport of, humanitarian assistance. The main
security issue related to the storage of relief assistance is the looting of
warehouses. While these areas are currently guarded, the problem of
looting has not been alleviated. An additional security presence, as
well-as increased lighting and fencing, are therefore required. The
transport of assistance to and from the warehouses is deemed to be
threatened at this time;
(d) Security for repatriation. Enhanced security is of particular
importance to facilitate the repatriation of refugees who have expressed
the wish to return to Rwanda. At present, just indicating a desire to
return to Rwanda can put refugees in considerable danger. It is
therefore considered essential that, upon indicating to relief workers
their desire to return to Rwanda, refugees should be offered security,
including immediate transfer to transit camps. Such camps would be
established in Zaire at some distance from the refugee camps to house
refugees until they can be transported to the border. These camps
would require a 24-hour security presence security for the
transportation of refugees to the border, which is now provided, should
be strengthened.
28. As indicated above, it was envisaged that these tasks could be carried out by
a local security force. A group of approximately 150 to 200 United Nations
civilian police officers would be required to train and monitor the local forces.
In addition, about 30 to 5o military observers would be deployed to liaise with
the local forces at the command level on issues related to the overall
implementation of the operation. The military observers would also assist
coordinate repatriation.
29. During my meeting with him on 15 December 1994 the Prime Minister of Zaire,
H.E. Mr. Kengo Wa Dondo, confirmed to me his Government's readiness to
provide the troops necessary to enhance security in the camps. I therefore
instructed my Special Representative for Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar Khan, to
visit Kinshasa to discuss with Zairian officials the possibility of the Government 
of Zaire undertaking these tasks, on the understanding that the international
community would be encouraged to assist with an appropriate level of logistic
and financial support.
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30. Mr. Khan visited Kinshasa from 28 to 31 December. He was accompanied by
a representative of UNHCR as well as the UNAMIR Deputy Force Commander
and logistic experts. In Kinshasa, Mr. Khan was received by the Prime minister
and met with the Ministers of Defence, Justice, Foreign Affairs and the interior.
Technical talks were also held at the working level. Zairian officials indicated
their Government's hope that the refugees would soon return to Rwanda. They
stressed that effective steps should be taken in Rwanda to ensure that
repatriation could take place in conditions of safety and dignity. They also
reiterated the Zairian Government's commitment to address the security
situation in the camps and indicated its readiness to initiate prompt action in
that regard, with the cooperation and support of the United Nations.
31. The Government of Zaire indicated that it would be prepared to deploy a
national security force of about 1,500 to 2,S00 troops to the camps. Through
technical discussions, the modalities of the logistic and other external support
needed for these troops were considered. The Government welcomed the
proposal that international police and military observers be deployed to the
area to provide technical advice to the local security force and to monitor and
coordinate the operation. However, it pointed out that it did not favour
deployment of United Nations peace-keeping troops to the camps.
32. In order to pursue this option, nearly 50 Member States were contacted to
ascertain their willingness to provide police personnel, stressing the
importance of French-speaking personnel. As of 23 January, only four
countries had expressed an interest in providing civilian police personnel and
only one of these countries was French-speaking. As regards military
observers, it was felt that, in order to expedite implementation, the military
observers could perhaps be provided by UNAMIR on a temporary basis,
subject to the concurrence of the contributing countries concerned. These
countries have been consulted in this regard. However, only one of them has
so far responded that it would, in principle, be prepared to allow its military
observers to operate in Zaire. It therefore seems that this second, more
modest, approach to enhancing security in the camps in Zaire faces difficulties
and cannot be pursued, at least at present.
33. Mr. Khan also visited the United Republic of Tanzania on 4 and 5 January
1995, where he was received by President Mwini and Prime Minister Msunya.
While in Dar-es-Salaam, he also met with the Chief of Defence Staff of the
Tanzanian Army and the Inspector-General of the Police. The Tanzanian
Government also indicated its view that the refugees should return to Rwanda
and that efforts should be-continued to ensure that conditions conducive to
voluntary repatriation of the refugees were created inside the country.
34. As noted above, at present, 310 Tanzanian police officers are providing
security in the camps. The Government indicated that it would be prepared to
increase this force to See, but that it would require logistic and operational
support from external sources in order to do so. Some support towards this




35. Another possibility, which has been explored by the Secretariat on a
contingency basis, is the provision of training and monitoring support to the
local security forces through contractual arrangements with a private
organization. Under such arrangements, a local force would be trained by a
team of 50 international instructors, 10 of whom would remain behind after the
initial training was completed to provide further on-the-job training assistance.
An additional 40 international experts would be required to monitor the
operation and for liaison and coordination functions. It is estimated that the
training programme would take a period of one month for each group of local
personnel trained and that, within two months of the start of the operation, the
first group of local personnel could be deployed to its area of operations.
Within four months, the entire local force would be trained and deployed to the
camps both north and south of Lake Kivu.
36. The possibility of undertaking such an operation, including the provision of
logistic and other support to the local security forces, has been discussed' with
UNHCR.However, initial financial estimates show that an operation of this
nature would be costly. Moreover, since it would have to be funded entirely
through voluntary contributions, UNHCR does not feel that it would be able to
mobilize the necessary resources, especially since some potential donor
Governments have indicated that they would not be in favour of this approach.
C. Security measures through UNHCR
37. Since the various options described above do not appear feasible, at least at
the present stage, have recently held further consultations on the problem of
security in the refugee camps, especially those in Zaire, with the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata. As a result of
these consultations, it has been decided that UNHCR would follow up with the
Government of Zaire on the discussions held by my Special Representative,
with a view to concluding appropriate arrangements, under UNHCR's refugee
protection and humanitarian assistance mandate, to enhance security in the
camps. I have informed the Prime Minister of Zaire accordingly and have
expressed to him the hope that these discussions would lead to the early
definition and implementation of mutually acceptable arrangements to
enhance the safety and security of the Rwandese refugees in Zaire.
38. UNHCR has dispatched a Special Envoy to Kinshasa for this purpose.
ÜNRCR will keep me informed of the progress made in this regard and I shall
advise the Security Council accordingly. UNHCR will also continue to explore
means of augmenting support to the Tanzanian Government to enable it to
increase the level of security it is currently providing in the camps. As regards
the refugee camps in Burundi, UNHCR has indicated that, for the time being,
the security situation in these camps is being adequately addressed through
the measures described in paragraph 7 above. UNAMIR. for its part, will
continue to coordinate closely with UNHCR in facilitating the safe and
voluntary repatriation of the refugees to Rwanda.
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IV. OBSERVATIONS
39. The scope and complexity of the problems in the Rwandese refugee camps,
especially those in Zaire, represent an unprecedented challenge. It is therefore
not surprising that the search for an appropriate solution to these problems
has been a difficult process. As the present report demonstrates, the options
aimed at enhancing security in the camps through a peace-keeping operation,
under one form or another, do not appear viable, at least at the present time.
40. Peace-keeping is essentially an instrument for conflict management and
resolution. It is true that in recent years it has undergone an important
quantitative and qualitative evolution. However, it is not designed and has not
generally been used to ensure security in refugee camps. Indeed it has
traditionally been the responsibility of the host countries to provide security to
the refugees located on their territory, albeit with an appropriate level of
support fro the international community.
41. I therefore understand the hesitations of Member States regarding the idea of
seeking a solution to the security problems in the camps through the
instrument of peace-keeping. There is no doubt, however, that the innocent
civilian:, who fled Rwanda in the wake of a devastating civil war and are
exposed daily to intimidation and violence in the camps, deserve the continued
attention and assistance of the international community, both where they are
now and in their efforts to return to their country. Furthermore, the
humanitarian relief personnel, who are risking their lives to ensure that basic
assistance reaches the refugees, should be provided with adequate security to
be able to carry out their work effectively. I therefore strongly urge the
international community to support the efforts of UNHCR, in cooperation with
the Governments of Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania. to put in
place satisfactory security arrangements in the camps and to provide
generously the resources required for this purpose.
42. Strengthening security in the camps is an indispensable step for creating
conditions conducive to the voluntary repatriation of the refugees. However, as
I stressed in my report of IS November, any effort to provide security in the
camps would be futile unless parallel steps are also taken inside Rwanda to
ensure that the refugees can return to their home communities without fear of
retribution or persecution and to promote genuine national reconciliation
between all segments of Rwandese society. Until now the Government of
Rwanda, which assumed power in a traumatized and shattered country, with
its infrastructure virtually destroyed and i ts inhabitants severely dislocated,
has been bereft of even the minimum resources to begin to restore normal
conditions. The commitments made at the recent Round-table Conference on
Rwanda and in response to the consolidated inter-agency appeal bring some
hope that this process now can commence. This in turn would promote the
prospects of reinvigorating the political process and providing a framework for
the action to be taken to address security in the camps and repatriation of the
refugees to Rwanda, as suggested by the security Council in its statement of
30 November 1994.
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43. The summit meeting of the leaders in the subregion, held in Nairobi on 7
January 1995, made a useful contribution towards the definition of such a
framework. This meeting brought together the Presidents of Burundi, Kenya,
Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia and the Prime
Minister of Zaire. My Special Representative for Rwanda also attended the
meeting. The regional leaders emphasized the close relationship between
improving both security in the refugee camps and conditions inside Rwanda in
order to create an environment conducive to the voluntary repatriation of the
refugees. In this connection, they affirmed their support for the establishment
and operationalization of the International Tribunal for Rwanda: the separation
of suspected perpetrators of genocide from innocent refugees and the
separation of intimidators from the refugee camps, as well as the
establishment of safe corridors from refugee camps to the Rwandese border
and of safe corridors and transit points inside Rwanda. They commended the
Government of Rwanda for the steps it has so far taken to establish a broad-
based government administration and urged the Government, towards this
end, to deepen its efforts, In the spirit of the Arusha peace accord. They
further urged the Government of Rwanda to put in place additional confidence-
building measures to encourage the voluntary return of refugees. The regional
leaders also urged the international community to increase its economic
support for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda.
44. The progress achieved at the regional summit of 7 January should facilitate
the work to be undertaken during the Regional Conference on Assistance to
Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region to be
hosted by the Organization of African Unity and UNHCR in Bujumbura in mid-
February. A preparatory meeting for the Conference was held in Addis Ababa
on 9 January. I hope that the Conference will lead to further progress in
creating the conditions necessary for the refugees and displaced persons to
return to their homes in safety and dignity and that it will open the way to the
holding of a broader conference aimed at identifying long-term solutions to
promote and ensure peace, security and development in the subregion.
Preliminary consultations with interested Governments are currently under way
to develop a consensus on the issues to be addressed by such a conference.
